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This article uses Polity IV data to probe system dynamics for studies of the global diffusion of
democracy from 1800 to 2000. By analogy with the Bass model of diffusion of innovations, as
translated into system dynamics by Sterman, the dynamic explanation proposed focuses on
transitions to democracy, soft power, and communication rates on a global level. The analysis
suggests that the transition from democratic experiences ('the soft power of democracy') can be
estimated from the systems dynamics simulation of an extended Bass model. Soft power, fueled by
the growth in communications worldwide, is today the major force behind the diffusion of democracy.
Our ﬁndings indicate the applicability of system dynamics simulation tools for the analysis of political
change over time in the world system of polities.
Democracy, Bass, Communication, System Dynamics, Power, Diffusion
In memory of Walter Goldberg; my mentor, with gratitude
The internet is showing people what life can be like. And when people who live in repressive
countries see that, it makes them want it. 
Salman Rushdie
 A New Systems Approach in Political Studies
Applying System Dynamics in Political Science
System dynamics simulations have previously been used in areas such as industrial dynamics and
world energy system forecasting. Jay Forrester founded this approach and elaborated its
applications in Industrial Dynamics (1961) and World Dynamics (1971). A considerable number of
studies have since established the place of the system dynamics approach in other types of
research, including business dynamics. The growing literature on system dynamics documents its
employment throughout the social sciences (Davidssen 2000). John Sterman's Business Dynamics
(2000) is a classic introduction to these techniques of systems thinking and simulations. However,
applications in political science generally appear to be lacking, "Simulation" in the context of system
dynamics means that a "target system, with its properties and dynamics, is described using a
system of equations which derive the future state of the target system from its actual state" (Gilbert
and Troitzsch 2005: 27). System dynamic simulation models are deﬁned by stocks and ﬂows, and
by the variables and constants affecting these ﬂows. (Mathematically, the stocks are integrals of the
ﬂows, and the derivatives of the stocks are the ﬂows, which constitute change in the system.)
We have here endeavored to apply system dynamics to an area that is of fundamental concern to
political science, and perhaps constitutes a prerequisite for the emergence of its modern forms: the
worldwide spread of democracy over the last two centuries. The application will be made primarily in
order to discern why democracy (in global, systemic-dynamic terms) has been diffused. Expressed
in system dynamics terminology, our question becomes: which ﬂows, variables, and constants
affected our focus variable, change in the stock of democratic polities in the world system of states
between 1800 and 2000, and how?
The yearly ﬂows to and from the stock of democratic states is explained by analogy to the Bass






diffusion of innovations, one important implication is that, in consequence of including changes from
soft power as a variable, it can be a paradigm for understanding social change in any population of
social units.
In addition, the model can be used for analyzing forces behind and changes in soft power over time
in the international system of states. Thus, it can also make more understandable to international
organizations involved in providing aid programs for such purposes the dynamics and prerequisites
for the diffusion of democracy.
Background to Social Science Simulation
There are several types of simulation techniques used in social science, and different rationales for
using them. For a general overview, see Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005). Also Clark and Cole eds.
(1975) give valuable historical and comparative insights into global simulation modeling.
Political scientist Karl Deutsch et al. (1977) presents a variety of world modeling studies produced by
the Committee on Quantitative and Mathematical Approaches to Politics within the International
Political Science Association (IPSA). Bremer, a contributor to Deutsch et al., also published a book
on Simulated Worlds (1977) that is a model for national decision making in response to the
international environment and national goals. Bremer also edited the reports from the GLOBUS
project, a major attempt to simulate political and economic developments worldwide (Bremer 1987).
Among other contributions to the ﬁeld of social science simulations we ﬁnd Cusack (1987) and Smith
(1987) on international political processes. Deutsch expresses great optimism in his foreword,
announcing the project as "GLOBUS-The rise of a new ﬁeld of political science". But after these
grand efforts, world modeling has failed to attain the prominent position in political science Deutsch
had hoped for (Deutsch 1990).
Nowadays, agent-based and game theory simulations are perhaps the best known examples of
simulations in political and social science (seeAxelrod 1984, Cederman 1997, 2003, Ciofﬁ-Revilla
2002). In the present study, however, the system dynamics simulation technique is used for the
analysis of ﬂows derived from empirical time series data. Both system dynamics and other
simulation techniques continue to be employed for other purposes. Among them is the logical-
systemic analysis of conceptual constructs, as in Cusack and Stoll's Exploring Realpolitik (1990), in
which the assumptions and propositions of the realist tradition are probed by means of computer
simulation.
Soft Power, Democratizations, and International versus National Political Systems
In the case of such a signiﬁcant example as the analysis of democratization, almost all efforts at
explanation are made without reference to global changes. Instead, studies of democratization
generally focus on factors at the national or comparative level, i.e., on national level explanatory
variables in a number of states. For instance, in empirical political research on why democracy
proliferates as a regime type on a world scale (such asLerner 1958, Lipset 1960, 1990, Almond &
Verba 1963, Dahl 1971, 1989, 1998, Diamond 1992, Hadenius 1992, Diamond & Plattner eds. 1993,
Vanhanen 1997, Inglehart 1997, Przeworski & Limongi 1997, Barro 1999, Boix & Stokes 2003,
Welzel et al. 2003, Welzel & Inglehart 2005a, 2005b, Inglehart & Wenzel 2005, Hadenius & Teorell
2005,Teorell & Hadenius 2005), we mostly ﬁnd interpretations in terms of requisites, correlates, and
time-speciﬁc factors on the national level. Among these are economic wealth and development,
industrialization, urbanization, communication, education, peaceful evolution of political competition,
equality, control of the military and the police by elected ofﬁcials, democratic beliefs and political
culture, aspirations to liberty, market economy, literacy, trade, percentages of Protestants, prior
regime types, relative distribution of power resources, political actors pursuing democracy, well-
being, trust, and social structure. These are all factors working primarily on the national level. Some
of them are commonly assessed in nations that are already democracies, rather than among
countries that are potential adopters. Therefore, these factors may indicate what is typical for
democracies, not the essential preconditions for non-democracies making a transition to democracy.
In cases where international inﬂuences have already been emphasized in democratization studies,
such as Uhlin (1993, 1995), seldom has the whole world system of states been under greater
scrutiny. There are a few exceptions, such as Starr (1991), where the "diffusion hypothesis" has
been tested empirically over a limited range of years and found valid on the basis of statistical tests.
International and historic democracy diffusion is also studied in Huntington (1991), Jaggers and Gurr
(1995), Ward et al. (1997), Kurzman (1998), O'Loughlin et al. (1998), Modelski & Perry (2002), Starr
& Lindborg (2003), Diamond (2003), Wejnert (2005), Gleditsch & Ward (2006), Leeson and Dean
(2009). Wejnert's multilevel regression of national (development) vs. international (diffusion) factors is
one impressive exception that concludes:
In both the world and regional analysis, however, the importance of development faded
with the inclusion of the diffusion variables due to the diffusion factors' remarkably
stronger predictive power for democratic growth than the factors of development (2005:
73).
Although non-linearity in the diffusion of democracy with regard to democratization pathways is






& Shin (2001), and others, the grand non-linearity of world system dynamics is seldom explained.
Samuel P. Huntington's The Third Wave (1991) is therefore provocative because the waves of
democratization he portrays suggest a non-linearity in regime changes in the world system.
Democratization, according to Huntington, is not diffused at a constant pace, but in an undulating
pattern, implying larger and larger forward spurts, interrupted by periods of retrograde movements
slipping from democracy back into non-democracy. Underlying the cumulative number of
democracies in the world each year are undercurrents of entries and exits of democracies and non-
democracies among emerging polities, as well as transitions from and to democracy by existing
states. Such an understanding of international change is very close to the stock and ﬂow approach
in system dynamics referred to above. Huntington analyzes change at the level of the world system
of states by means of dynamic, independent, global variables, i.e., those changing over long periods
of time among (rather than within) nations.
Huntington's explanation of the third wave of democratization is based on factors that may be
considered global rather than national.[1] These are (1) the deepening legitimacy problems on a world
scale among authoritarian systems, (2) global economic growth that has raised living standards,
education, and broadened urbanization, (3) the transformation of national Catholic churches from
defenders of the status quo to opponents of authoritarianism, (4) the promotion of human rights in the
policies of external actors, and (5) snowballing or demonstration effects.
The last factor, the demonstration effect, is of particular interest from a contingency and systems
perspective. First of all, it clearly indicates a dynamic understanding of how most social systems
work. Demonstration, imitation, and word-of-mouth effects typify diffusion processes in social
systems, mainly because imitation is a means of reducing risk. Doing what others already have
done, or are soon likely to do, carries with it the conviction of not losing more in making a new
investment than one's rivals can lose. Instead, it is likely that quickly imitating them will lead to
advantages and secure access to resources that are likely to diminish in the long run. From our
political science perspective, forces of imitation, snowballing, word-of-mouth effect, and diffusion
correspond to what Joseph Nye has called soft power. Such soft power, or "getting others to want
what you want,"[2] is normally based on the principle of imitating a pioneer one admires. Our focus
will be on the soft power of a political regime type, and how it is diffused by imitation.
Imitation requires communication about what is being imitated. Books, newspapers, radio programs,
and television broadcasts have historically enhanced knowledge about political conditions
elsewhere, including those prevailing in democracies. Studies of the development of democracy
since the 1960s have included communication as a factor in their analyses (Lerner 1958, Lipset
1960, Cutright 1963, Pye ed. 1963, McCrone & Cnudde 1967). The current availability of time series
data on both the diffusion of democracy and means of mass communication makes it possible to
relate the two in dynamic models. We are coming closer to achieving dynamic models of what were
once merely theories of communication and projecting their long-term effect on society.
The Modelski and Perry Study
The question Modelski & Perry address in their valuable study (2002) is whether the growth in the
number of democracies in the world system follows a regular pattern; and, more speciﬁcally, whether
that pattern is in accord with the Fischer-Pry substitution model of technological change. Modelski &
Perry deﬁne democracy as a "fundamental social innovation, a new form of social organization,
indeed a superior technology of cooperation in large-scale societies" (2002: 360). They argue that
democracy evolves both by mechanisms of experimentation and through internal learning, and their
investigation focuses on the quantitative diffusion of democratic communities in the world. They ask
whether this diffusion describes a pattern of regularity in accordance with the Fischer-Pry equation,
thus conforming to one of the models of innovation-diffusion. They answer in the afﬁrmative. They go
on to assume that the process of democratization in the world system proceeds as the diffusion of an
innovation or a cluster of innovations. The same authors then ask whether democratization, i.e., the
diffusion of democratic innovations, is in fact also a learning process. If so, they argue, it should be
characterized by logistics (a curve representing a function involving an exponential, but also a
limitation factor, shaped like the letter S). This is common to the diffusion of innovation in general, as
described, for example, by Rogers (1995), and applied in the present article as well.
Modelski and Perry continue to ask whether one speciﬁc model of diffusion and technological
substitution, the Fischer-Pry model, is useful for understanding the shape of the curve of horizontal
democratization on a world scale. The Fischer-Pry model is expressed as follows (seeModelski &
Perry 2002):
F / (1- F) = exp [2ʱ (t-t0)]
where F represents the fraction of substitution (in this case the 'fraction democratic' or the
percentage of world population [my emphasis] living in democracies), and 1 stands for the size of the
'market', i.e., the world population. The slope of the curve is 2ʱ, with t standing for time, and t0 for the
midpoint of the process, that is, when half of the world's population lives under democracy. A plot on
the semi log (ln) scale of F / (1- F) as a function of time then allows for a linear regression.1.16
1.17
2.1
Modelski & Perry's results indicate that a 10% saturation of democracy in the world was reached in
1885; that the midpoint (or 50% ﬂex point) occurred in 1999; and that 90% saturation will be achieved
around the year 2113. The share of explained variance in ln F / (1- F), namely R2, is then as high as
0.95 in their analysis (2002).
Modelski & Perry then argue that, since the cumulative world population living in democratic
communities can be described in terms of such a logistic S-shaped distribution (which, in a semi-
logarithmic scale, would appear as a straight line,) then the democratization of states in the world
system can, in fact, be argued to be a social learning process that is identical to a process of
democratic innovation and diffusion. Therefore, such social learning and diffusion models generally
also produce the same type of distribution. However, looking at their data, the patterns of diffusion of
democracy among fractions of populations in their analysis (and among democratic regimes in the
present analysis) are very similar. The regression line produced by using frequencies of democratic
regimes, rather than the fraction democratic of world populations, has an even better ﬁt (an R2 = 0.93
rather than 'only' 0.91). Polities seem to follow a log-linear pattern somewhat closer to the learning
assumption than does the fraction democratic of populations, even though the difference is miniscule.
We may conclude that democratization may best be studied at the polity, rather than the population,
level.[3] The comparison between population and polity level regression leads to the conclusion that
diffusion of democracy on an aggregate international level is easier to predict than learning or
diffusion of democracy at the national (as opposed to the population) level. It can also be argued that
learning equals diffusion of knowledge-in this case, ways to institutionalize democracy.
 Data and Method
The Use of Polity IV and IVd Data on "Institutionalized Democracy"
Along with Modelski & Perry (2002), Polity IV data, as well as the speciﬁc Polity IVd data set (a
condensed version with only those years included in which a regime variable changes), will be
employed. Drawing on these unique data we can study the growth in the number of democracies and
non-democracies, and see how the total number of polities have changed since 1800 (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Polity Population Dynamics 1800-2000: Democratic, Authoritarian and
Totalitarian States (Source: Polity IV data).
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate how polities are deﬁned in terms of their value as an institutionalized
democracy variable in the Polity IV data set: totalitarian states have a value of 0, authoritarian have 1-5, and
non-democracies have 0-5, including totalitarian and authoritarian components. Values of democracies are 6-10.





Data show aggregate levels of three populations of polities (democracies, authoritarian, and
totalitarian states) for each year from 1800 to 2000. The data used in this ﬁgure is based on the Polity
IV regime panel data set in which, beginning in 1800, all countries with a population larger than
500,000 are coded annually according to an array of institutional variables (one of which is
"institutionalized democracy"). This variable is expressed on an 11 point scale (0-10) where,
following the Modelski & Perry study (2002), a score of 6 or more is deﬁned as "democracy".
Marshall & Jaggers (2002) deﬁne the Polity IV variable "institutionalized democracy" as consisting of
three interdependent elements: (1) the presence of institutions and procedures through which
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders, (2) the existence of
institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, and (3) the guarantee of civil
liberties to all citizens in daily life and acts of political participation. Other aspects of pluralistic
democracy, such as the rule of law, a system of checks and balances, and freedom of the press,
among others, are considered means toward, or speciﬁc manifestations of, these general principles.
The institutionalized democracy indicator is an additive scale derived from the weighted coding of
four variables: (a) competitiveness of executive recruitment, (b) openness of executive recruitment,
(c) constraints on the chief executive, and (d) competitiveness of political participation (Table 1).
Table 1: Polity IV Variables and Weights in Coding of Institutionalized
Democracy (Source: Marshall and Jaggers, 2002, p. 14)
Authority Coding Scale Weight
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment:
(3) Election +2
(2) Transitional +1
Openness of Executive Recruitment:
(3) Dual/election +1
(4) Election +1
Constraints on Chief Executive:
(7) Executive parity or subordination: +4
(6) Intermediate category +3
(5) Substantial limitations +2
(4) Intermediate category +1




The highest value (10) is achieved on the scale (a) if "competitiveness of executive recruitment" is
"election" (+2), "openness of executive recruitment" is "dual/election" or "election" (+1), "constraints
on the chief executive" is "executive parity or subordination" (+4), and "competitiveness of political
participation" is "competitive" (+3). If none of the levels listed are reached, the sum total is then zero
(which in this study is deﬁned as totalitarianism, since all the institutions of democracy are lacking).
In addition to following Modelski & Perry (2002) in deﬁning the minimum value of institutionalized
democracy as 6, we will consider all polities with values from 1 to 5 as "authoritarian".
The above deﬁnition of institutionalized democracy and the operationalization of democracy is open
to criticism on various grounds. The reason it is employed here is primarily technical and
comparative: (a) it is the only operational deﬁnition offered for the single dataset available, and (b) it is
also the one used by Modelski & Perry (2002).[4] Space does not permit a comprehensive listing of
all the institutional democracies in the world (see the listing in Appendix 1 and the country-by-country
case description on the Polity Project home page[5]). Nevertheless, the aforementioned listing
appears to support one of the major ﬁndings of this investigation: the tendency to imitate or adopt
democratic institutions from other countries, i.e., the soft power of democracy as a regime type
where information about these democracies is accessible.
Early Democratizers





democracy in the world system of polities, the USA, with the score of 7. The next institutionalized
democracy to appear is Peru in 1828, with a score of 6 (reﬂecting the liberal constitution adopted in
that year). The third institutionalized democracy using this indicator is the United Kingdom in 1837,
with a score of 6 (probably in consequence of the transformation of the sovereign to a ceremonial
role when Victoria ascended the throne). From 1847 to 1854, Liberia, France, Switzerland, and
Belgium reach 6 or more on the institutionalized democracy scale. In Liberia's case, this reﬂects the
adoption of a constitution emulating that of the United States by the oldest independent state in Africa.
For France, male suffrage and political reform were the result of the uprising of 1848. The same year
marks the inception of political stability in Switzerland, and by 1853 the Belgian regime is considered
to be institutionally democratized. In 1854, under the so-called Bloemfontein Convention, local Boer
settlers formed the independent Orange Free State. The political structure of this new state combined
traditional Boer institutions with Dutch and American constitutional theory. After becoming a self-
governed crown colony in 1857, New Zealand was considered an institutionalized democracy. In
1864, the liberal Veniz￩los in Greece, after a landslide victory in the elections, instituted a wide-
ranging program of constitutional reform for political modernization. At a conference in Quebec,
Canada, in 1864, an agreement was reached on a general federal union. This marks the inaugural
year of democracy in Canada. In the same year, Mosquera, who had once ruled Columbia as a
dictator, received another two-year term as president under that country's new liberal constitution.
Other examples might be cited. These countries are the early pioneers of institutionalized
democracy, as deﬁned in Table 1 and listed in Appendix 1.
Waves of Democracy Diffusion
It may be noted that what is generally considered the ﬁrst wave in Figure 1 looks rather like two
waves, with the second starting around 1915 and expanding until it reaches a peak at the beginning
of the 1920s. The countries involved are primarily from Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe:
Denmark (1915), Estonia, Finland, Sweden (1917), Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Poland (1918),
Germany (1919), and Austria and Latvia (1920). The wave from the mid-1940s to approximately the
early 1970s includes a large number of former colonies, such as Guatemala (1944), Brazil, Burma
(or Myanmar), Sri Lanka (1946), and India (1949), along with re-democratizing polities as well, such
as Austria, France (1946), and Italy (1948). Dramatic increases in the number of democracies are
also noted for the early 1990s. Not only have previously socialist and post-Soviet republics such as
Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Slovenia, and Ukraine (1991) now
democratized, but also Benin, Zambia (1991), Congo Brazzaville, Guyana, Madagascar, Mali, Niger,
Paraguay, and Peru (1992). No wave is easily classiﬁed in geographic or historic terms (see
Appendices 1 and 2.)
Upon more closely examining the number of democracies, the dynamics of the world system of
states becomes evident in the way totalitarian states (deﬁned as 0 on the "institutionalized
democracy" variable) relate to authoritarian ones (deﬁned as scoring 1-5 on the same variable). We
see totalitarianism making gains from the early 1900s until about 1980, then declining rapidly-
primarily in consequence of the fall of the Soviet empire, together with most of its Eastern and Central
European satellites. However, these states not only adopt democracy, but at a later point some also
feed back into the stock of authoritarian states. More recent ﬁgures (2000-2003) show that we now
have as many authoritarian as we do totalitarian states. In addition, we can see that the number of
democracies is approximately the same as the sum total of authoritarian and totalitarian states
combined. But which stocks of democracies and non-democracies are involved, and what ﬂows
there are between them, cannot be detected using these aggregate ﬁgures. Despite our interest in
transitions to democracy over the last two centuries and the increased stock of democracies that
have resulted, we still cannot grasp the underlying polity population dynamics. We somehow need to
separate the ﬂows, while at the same time analyzing them, so that we know exactly how many
states transition from non-democracies to democracies each year and vice versa-and why.
Separate ﬂows in the system of states between the stocks of non-democracies and democracies
are not easily grasped by means of statistics. Related time series data are difﬁcult to model in their
dynamic (i.e., time-varying) inﬂuence upon each other.[6] Therefore, the approach taken here is to
use software capable of analyzing ﬂows between stocks. The Polity IV regime panel data is coded
into a system dynamics simulation or stock-and-ﬂow model (in this case, using Powersim
software[7]). Compared with most system dynamics simulations, the modeling in this study, in its
original form, uses real regime panel data (Polity IVd). Only in a subsequent step is one of the ﬂows
of this real data model of the world's stocks of democracies and non-democracies simulated, along
with the ﬂows or transitions between them (i.e., the ﬂow of transitions from non-democracy to
democracy).
The fact that we use a statically deﬁned measurement for democracy, that is, a single standard for
the whole period, will in no way contradict the dynamic and non-linear assessment and analysis of
democracy proposed here. On the contrary, a dynamic analysis requires static scales to measure
the dynamics. Even if we deﬁne democracy here in the simplest possible way (as ≥ 6 on the
institutionalized democracy scale), the analysis may well be extended by studying the diffusion of
other new forms and interactions of evolving democratic institutions.
Finally, we will employ Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data on mass communication, speciﬁcally,








means) each year of the twentieth century, as a basis for estimating two major components of
communicating experiences of democracy with non-democracies. Banks data are the most
commonly used source for a diverse set of historic variables that include communication. We do
realize, however, that unfortunately communication time series data is lacking for most other
components of communications between the two types of polities during the period investigated here.
Using Real Data in a System Dynamics Simulation Approach
The ﬂows we are suggesting here consist of global streams of national democratizations, together
with the underlying processes that affect net democratization ﬁgures worldwide. Thus, as noted
above, emergences or entry events ("births") and exits or disappearance events ("deaths") of
institutionalized non-democracies and democracies are included, as well as the ﬂows of states into
democracies and drifts back to non-democracies ("transitions" and "reversals").
By including entries and exits of non-democracies and democracies, and the transitions in both
directions between the two kinds of regimes, the basic Bass model, interpreted in a generalized way,
deﬁnes the possible changes in the population system of global democratization. However,
determination of the global system of states leaves no room for probabilities.
Models of change should be applicable to change of any kind. Thus, the transitions between two
states in a population of entities, such as the existence or non-existence of democracy or any other
political institution (e.g., female suffrage, the rule of law, or a proportional election system) should also
be capable of simulation and analysis. The model presented here can be applied for all social change
between any dichotomous states A and B among n units.
The methodology we propose is based on empirical data, although a simulation program is employed
to process that data dynamically. First, a real-world replica of democratization over the last two
centuries is formulated as a system dynamics model ﬁlled with regime panel data. Several ﬂows can
then be analyzed separately or simultaneously. These ﬂows are the entries, exits, and transitions of
non-democracies and democracies already mentioned. Data are extracted from Polity IVd data (see
Appendices 1 and 2). Second, one element of this model (in this case the ﬂow from non-democracies
to democracies) is exchanged with an "empty" and as yet undeﬁned ﬂow determined by variables
and constants, all of which reﬂect the known Bass with discards diffusion model. After having
deﬁned the proposed variables and constants, a simulation of this particular segment of the model
(which is otherwise based on real data) will produce a behavior similar or identical to the previously-
known actual behavior, thus indicating a dynamic explanation of why democracy is diffused on a
world scale.
 The Bass Model
The Analogy with the Bass Model with Discards
One of the techniques that can help political scientists use systems analyses is the system
dynamics approach. In its thinking and in the application of simulation tools from this perspective,
innovation diffusion has been modeled in a variety of ways-perhaps most notably as 'Bass models'
with their variations. The inventor of these models, Frank Bass (1926-2006), who was a marketing
professor at the University of Texas at Dallas, originally published his model in Management Science
in 1969. Some of the largest U.S. corporations have used the Bass model, and many business
schools have applied it to diffusion studies of technical and social innovations, such as the diffusion
of educational ideas, VCRs, color TV, PCs, answering machines, overhead projectors, and similar
items (Rogers 1995 and the Frank M. Bass homepage). Extensions of the model have also been
made into studies of successive generation technologies (Norton & Bass 1987). However, there is
no indication that the diffusion of the Bass model (Bass 2004) has reached the realm of
democratization analysis until now.
What is, then, the Bass model in its system dynamics form (Sterman 2000)? It assumes that two
fundamental forces or communication channels (marketing on the one hand and interpersonal word-
of-mouth on the other) inﬂuence potential adopters of an innovation (see ﬁgure below). Individual
adoption of new products as a result of marketing or advertising occurs continually throughout the
diffusion process, but is concentrated in the relatively early stages of diffusion. Individuals adopting
innovations as a result of interpersonal messages about the product (i.e., as an effect of its 'soft
power') expand in number during the ﬁrst half of the diffusion process and decline thereafter creating
the typical logistic, S-shaped diffusion curve. One unique contribution of the Bass model is that it is
predictive, providing a formula for estimating the rate of adoption in advance (Rogers 1995).
In our analysis we use Sterman's Bass model with discards (2000), since it provides an analogy with
democracy as innovation (as we will see in detail below), and includes discards as an analogy with
reversals into non-democratic institutions, thus providing for potential adoptions of new versions of
democracy.
In system dynamics simulations, change is analyzed in terms of (a) ﬂows between states or
conditions, and (b) factors affecting those ﬂows, whether they are variables or constants. In3.5
diagrams of models and their behavior, ﬂows are depicted as pipes, and states and conditions as
boxes. Flows are affected or regulated by means of 'valves' that are dynamically or statically
determined by variables (circles) or constants (diamonds). The system dynamics models are totally
determined mathematically and yield dynamics in numbers of units in a speciﬁc state at a given point
in time. The model itself, however, remains unchanged during the simulation, in contrast to
evolutionary and agent-based simulation models (see Gilbert & Troitzsch 2005).
Figure 2. Bass Diffusion Model with Discards (Source:Sterman 2000)
Note: Double arrows denote ﬂows from and to stocks of adopters and potential adopters of product
A. Boxes indicate stocks (volumes of adopters or potential adopters), while single arrows indicate
inﬂuence exerted by variables (circles) and constants (angled squares) on other variables. As seen
in attached diagrams, levels and variables can both be dynamically described. R indicates (1)
reinforcing loops (the more adoption of A, the more adoption from word-of-mouth, the higher the
adoption rate, the more adoption of A, etc.), and B (2) balancing loops (the more adoption from
advertising, the higher the adoption rate, the fewer potential adopters, the lower adoption from
advertising, the lower the adoption rate, etc.). Notice in the lower diagram the minor contribution of
adoption from advertising in relation to adoption from word-of-mouth.





The Bass model with discards (or 'BassDisc' model) in the ﬁgure above displays the analogy
between diffusion of innovations and diffusion of democracy. In this model, there is a ﬂow from
potential adopters to actual adopters of an innovation (in our case, the regime innovation 'democracy'
among potential adopter nations). This ﬂow - our focus variable - is driven both by advertising
(democratic propaganda) and word-of-mouth (communicated experiences of democracy). The
BassDisc model has a reversal discard rate that, in this analogy, indicates the reversal of democracy
among states back into non-democracy. Each of the ﬂows and their determinants require detailed
scrutiny as valid parts of an analogy with democracy diffusion in the world. However, this ﬁrst model
lacks the in- and out-ﬂows of potential adopters (non-democracies) and actual adopters
(democracies) and is simpliﬁed on the assumption of a constant number of actors in the system.
Therefore, deﬁned in the form of an equation, the adoption (of democracy) rate could simply be
expressed as:
AdoptionRate = AdoptionFromAdvertising +
AdoptionFromWord-of-Mouth
The analogy: Each year, the number of polities reaching a value of at least 6 on the 'institutionalized
democracy' variable in the Polity IV data set equals the number reaching this value as an effect of
'marketing' or 'advertising' of democratic ideas in non-democracies (such as by parties and
politicians from both non-democracies and democracies), plus the number reaching this value as an
effect of transition resulting from word-of-mouth reports about democracies, i.e., positive
communicated experiences or 'the soft power' of democracy. The equation for the later analogical




In this ﬁrst equation, the sum of transitions to democracy as a rate of polities transformed per time
unit equals the sum of transitions resulting from propaganda disseminated by political actors in non-
democracies and democracies, plus those transitions resulting from the soft power of democracy.
In the ﬁrst place, there might appear to be fundamental differences between the BassDisc model and
a democracy diffusion model: 'advertising' of a product for sale in a market is not a concept normally
used in the analysis of the spread of democracy. However, looking closer at the mechanism from the
perspective of the proposed analogy, it seems apparent that spokespersons of democratic parties
'advertise' democracy (or a particular type of democracy) in books, articles, speeches, party
propaganda, statements, policies, and diplomacy. In recent decades, as mass media has become
increasingly globalized, the ability of democratic governments to effectively pursue their policies is
intrinsically linked to their ability to get across their message in mass media, notably TV channels
such as CNN. The impact of this type of political campaigning may differ. Thus, in analogy with the
BassDisc model:
AdoptionFromAdvertising = PotentialAdopters *
AdvertisingEffectivessness
The analogy: The yearly number of non-democracies adopting democracy attributable to the political
'advertising' of democratic ideas in non-democracies equals the product of the number of non-
democracies and the effectiveness with which positive messages are communicated. The analogous
equation may be formulated as:
TransFromDemIdeas = NondemocraciesSim *
CommunicationEffectivessness
Thus, the rate of adoption of democracy as projected by this model is the result of political
'advertising' of democratic ideas and ideals by democracies themselves. This political 'advertising' in
the global marketplace of democracies may be more or less effective, and in the BassDisc model
above, the effectiveness is assumed to be constant (although this, too, can be modiﬁed in a
democratization model). In the lower diagram of the ﬁgure above, one can see that adoption from
advertising is important in the initial diffusion phase, while adoption from word-of-mouth subsequently
grows very rapidly until the system's carrying capacity of potential adopters is reached.
The adoption rate, on the other hand, is determined analytically by the sum of two other functions: the
loops of 'word-of-mouth' and market saturation. In the market-driven Bass model, the adoption from
word-of-mouth is the most important in the long run (see the ﬁgure's lower diagram, curve 1). At ﬁrst,
adoptions from word-of-mouth (due to the attractiveness or soft power of the innovation) are zero and
thus lower than adoption from advertising. However, as the number of adopters grows, the adoption
from word-of-mouth accelerates. The reason for this may be seen in the following equation:





ContactRate * AdoptionFraction / TotalPopulation
The Analogy: The number of adoptions of democracy each year among states in the world system
equals the number of democracies times the number of non-democracies times the rate by which
contacts are made between non-democracies and democracies (communicating positive
experiences of democracy) and the fraction of those states that become democracies as a result of
that contact, divided by the number of states in the world system that year. The equation becomes:
TransFromSoftPowerOfDem = DemocraciesSim * NondemocraciesSim *
CommunicationRate * TransitionFraction / TotalNoOfStatesSim
Though this is not a deﬁnition of soft power, it is an equation that deﬁnes the factors that produce
transitions to democracy from soft power. Soft power is driven by (a) the communication rate
(communications per unit of time) between potential adopters and actual adopters, and (b) the
fraction of times (percentages of the contacts) such interactions result in adoption per population unit.
In the ﬁrst model, these two factors are deﬁned as constants; however, they will play important roles
in the further elaboration of the model.
The soft power or word-of-mouth effect is small if the number of democracies or non-democracies is
small, but grows in importance as the number of adopters relative to the number of potential adopters
is close, since the product of the two is largest when they are equal. When the number of potential
and actual adopters are equal (i.e., when curves 1 and 2 cross each other in the upper diagram in the
ﬁgure), the soft power or adoption from word-of-mouth is strong, as it is close to its peak. As soon as
there are more adopters-thus less potential adopters-the product of the two decreases. This is why
the loop reinforces itself at ﬁrst, but ﬂattens out towards the end: the more adopters of democracy,
the more additional adoptions, but decreasingly so when democracy approaches the carrying
capacity of the world system of states. Therefore, as will be noticed in the analysis below, the soft
power of democracy is extremely strong around the time the number of democracies is close to or
equals the number of non-democracies (something that occurred in the year 1991, since in 1992 the
number of democracies was 78, which is 11 more than the non-democracies).
Finally, the discard rate in the BassDisc model is determined by the average 'product lifetime', which
in our case is the average lifetime of a type of democratic regime. It can be described as:
DiscardRate = Adopters /
AverageProductLife
The analogy: The number of democracies abandoning democracy each year equals the number of
democracies at the time divided by the average lifetime of democracies for that year. The equation
would appear in analogy as:
ReversalsFromDemRates =
DemocraciesSim / AverageDemLife
However, since the model is based on real data, the 'discard rate' would be here deﬁned as the
values of actual Polity IVd data on reversals from democracy to non-democracy each year (see
Appendix 1 and 3).
The equation above can be understood as the reversal rate from democracy to non-democracy. In
this case it is described mathematically, rather than analytically. The equation does not actually
explain the discard rate; it deﬁnes it. The discard or reversal from democracy rate is simply
determined mathematically by two factors, namely, how many adopters of democracy there are
divided by the average product lifetime each year (in this case, the longevity of democracy). The
more democracies there are and the shorter their life spans, the higher the discard (reversal) rate.
This ﬂow will not be simulated in the present article, since the actual data on reversals can be
extracted from the Polity IVd data set (see Appendix 1 and how it is incorporated in the equations in
Appendix 3). It may be noted that the average lifetime will probably not increase in the younger
democracies, due to the fact that the ﬁrst democratizers were those with the most favorable
conditions for democracy at the time of its adoption, while later democratizers may often lack the
solid preconditions the pioneers had.
It is also useful to note the analogy between the Bass model and the so-called SIR models in
epidemiology. SIR is an acronym for Susceptible, Infected, and Recovered. 'Susceptible' signiﬁes the
potential adopters, 'infected' the adopters, and 'recovered' those who discard the innovation. We see
that the global diffusion of democracy can be likened to a global 'epidemic' in which non-democracies
are 'susceptible' to democracy, democracies are 'infected', and those countries that have abandoned
democracy are 'recovered' (see ￅberg & Sandberg 2003, chap. 1, on the theory of institutional
evolution). The same mathematical calculations would apply. The reason epidemics and the diffusion
of technological and social innovations exhibit similar patterns remains a challenge for the natural and
social sciences to explain.3.15
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Using System Dynamics Simulation for the Empirical Analysis of Democracy Diffusion
The Polity IVd data set, in contrast to the full Polity IV version, includes only those events in which
the institutional set-up has changed, making it easier to extract events where polities changed from
≤5 to ≥6 on the institutionalized democracy variable (see Figure 1). Polity IV is only needed when
comparing quantities of polities. Therefore, in the simulations below, the Polity IVd set has been used
to extract those polities that emerge ("are born") and disappear ("die") as non-democratic or
democratic polities, in addition to cases in which existing polities are democratizing or reverting to
non-democracies (see Appendices 1 and 2). On the other hand, the variable "totalitarian percentage
of non-democratic states", is derived from the full Polity IV set. It should be emphasized that the
model may be elaborated by including additional transitions between values of the variable
"institutionalized democracy". This would, however, also complicate the construction of the model
and its interpretation.
Although the method is based on system dynamics simulation techniques, the model is ﬁrst ﬁlled
with "real" (Polity IVd) data. The ﬂow system deﬁned using the simulation program appears in Figure
3.
Figure 3. A Simple Stock and Flow Model of Diffusion of Institutionalized Democracy in the
World System of States 1800-2000
Note: Structure of stock and ﬂow diagram is analogous to the Bass model as deﬁned by Sterman
(2000). Stocks of non-democracies, democracies, and ﬂows (rates) are deﬁned in correspondence
with data sets Polity IV and IVd. Init. of non-democracies (n = 21) and democracies (n = 1) are
constants denoting initial number in 1800. See data in Appendices 1 and 2.
Democracies = + dt * EntryDem - dt * Exit_Dem - dt *
ReversalFromDemRate + dt * ActualTransToDemRate 
NonDemocracies = - dt * ExitNonDem + dt * EntryNonDem + dt
* ReversalFromDemRate - dt * ActualTransToDemRate
The two boxes labeled "non-democracies" and "democracies" are deﬁned in system dynamics
terminology as "levels", i.e., volumes of each time unit, while the "pipes" to and from them are "ﬂows"
determined by "valves" consisting of rates of transition per year. There are two constants in the
model, indicated by angled squares: the initial number of democracies in 1800 (one polity, i.e., the
US), and the initial number of non-democracies in the same year (21 states, see Appendix 1). On the
basis of a Polity IVd data set, the years for transitions to democracy and reversals to non-
democracy are coded, along with the number of polities emerging or disappearing each year as
democracies and non-democracies. Our focus variable, transitions to democracy in number of




Figure 4. Transitions to Democracies 1800-2000 (Number of Polities per Year) (Source:
Polity IVd)
Note: See Appendix 1 for details on polity transitions to democracy.
Figure 4 illustrates what is provided in table form in the last column of Appendix 1: the number of
transitions from non-democracies to democracies each year. The next step in the analysis is to
exploit the fact that inﬂows and outﬂows to and from non-democracies and democracies can now be
separated analytically into (a) transitions and reversals, and (b) entries and exits of non-democracies
and democracies. For instance, we can see that transitions to democracy (number of non-
democratic polities becoming democratic per year) increased after World War I and again after World
War II, and then accelerated at the end of the 1980s with the fall of the Berlin Wall.
We thus arrive at the ﬁrst major advantage of the real data simulation approach advocated here: our
causal analysis can concentrate on the separate processes of transitions to and reversals from
democracy without having to combine them in gross ﬂows. Reversals into non-democracies are less
frequent (as can be seen in Appendix 1). Entries and exits of non-democracies and democracies
also reﬂect valuable state and nation-state building patterns, the treatment of which is beyond the
scope of the present investigation (see their frequencies in Appendix 2). Therefore, the fact that
regime entry ("birth"), regime exit ("death"), democratization, and what we may term "de-
democratization" can be outcomes of wars, invasions, violence, and aid are not considered here. For
our purposes, they only represent alternate ways in which regimes emerge or disappear, transform
into democracies, or undergo reversals into non-democracies. Wars between sovereign states and
invasions are also phenomena on an international, rather than global, system level. The system
modeled with real data is then used as the point of departure for a replicated model in which
transitions from non-democracies to democracies are simulated.
The present article, in focusing on transitions to democracies, analyzes them by means of
simulations apart from other transitions in the model. A duplicate of the model is thus created and
modiﬁed in two steps. First, the real-data transition to democracy ﬂow is replaced by employing an
empty ﬂow. Second, this ﬂow is determined by the factors deﬁned above (analogous to the Bass
model with discards in Figure 3). (Copied variables are indicated by the sufﬁx "copy".)
At this point, we can analyze the extent to which transitions to democracy are actually determined by
entries, exits of democracies and nondemocracies. The "advertising" of democracy by means of
democratic ideas, in combination with transitions prompted by accounts of existing democracies, are
given and deﬁned by the Bass model. As discussed earlier, transitions attributed to democratic ideas
are conditioned by the effectiveness of communications, while transitions due to the soft power of
democracy are affected by the communication rate and the transition fraction (see Figure 5). In fact,
the Bass model is largely analogous to the two-step hypothesis in classical communication theory
(Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955), in which step one refers to direct inﬂuences (Bass's effects prompted by
advertising) and step two to indirect inﬂuences from opinion leaders (Bass's effects prompted by
word-of-mouth).Figure 5. First Standard Bass (with Discards) Model of Democratization in the World






From this initial simulation of transition to democracy[8] (see Figure 5), we can see clearly that much
of the raggedness in the true democracy diffusion curve is due simply to the entry and exit rates of
non-democracies and democracies and the reversals from democracy rates. The simulated
democracy diffusion curve is striking in its similarity to the real curve, but less exponential for the
period beginning about 1950.
Assumptions and Implications of the ﬁrst Standard Bass Model Simulation
In this model that incorporates real data, the communication effectiveness of democratic
"propaganda" in non-democracies is considered a constant. It must be set to a very small ﬁgure
(0.0005) in order not to produce a curve that increases too much in the early 1800s: as noted before,
it is in this initial diffusion phase that the "advertising" factor plays a role. The communication
effectiveness has to increase drastically from 0.0005 for the period from 1800 to 1980 and reach
approximately 0.4 by 2000, without changing other parameters, in order to produce the number of
democracies we know to be correct. This explosion of communication effectiveness in non-
democracies over the last twenty years of the twentieth century does not seem likely, although it may
be a partial truth over the short run. Democratic forces in the former Soviet bloc probably found
spreading propaganda easier because of glasnost and the relaxed control of the opposition under
Gorbachev, which in turn may have caused a sudden increase in the effectiveness of communicating
the virtues of democracy. This also implies that, given what we know from the real data diffusion
curve, the communication effectiveness of democratic forces in non-democracies was very small,
especially during the ﬁrst years of democracy. Thus, it appears that democratic parties in non-
democracies had little impact on democratization on a global scale. Were this not the case, we would
have already had a much sharper increase in the numbers of democracies in the early 1800s.
Therefore, transition rates caused by democratic ideas in non-democratic countries can be
considered insigniﬁcant, as a quick glance at the diffusion curve will show. Causes of diffusion must
be sought elsewhere. Taking a longer view of the two centuries from 1800 to 2000, a transition to
democracy is most likely the result of the international communication of what it is like to experience
democracy -what can be called the "soft power" of democracy, by analogy with the word-of-mouth
effect in the Bass model.
Thus, there must be another, much stronger force that has boosted the diffusion of democracy in the
global system since the latter half of the nineteenth century. To speak in terms of the Bass model,
this is the word-of-mouth effect-what Nye refers to as soft power in the case of early democracies or,
to use Huntington's term, "snowballing". The strong inﬂuence on the transition rate produced by
internationally communicated democratic experiences equalsthe product of the number of
democracies, number of non-democracies, communication rate, and fraction of polities that transition
into democracy as a result of such communication, divided by the number of states.
In this ﬁrst test of the Bass model, the communication rate and transition fraction must be set to small
values (1.5 and 0.015). Theoretically, this would mean that the experience of democracy is
communicated to all non-democracies on an average of 1.5 times a year, but that in only 1.5% of
those instances do non-democracies actually become democracies. Thus, the experience of
success in one country may in very few cases trigger democratization in another. The increase in
soft power has its peak in inﬂuencing transitions to democracy when the numbers of non-
democracies and democracies are equal (a point reached at some time in 1991).
The rate of communication and the percentage of countries that became democratized as a result of
these communications are two additional factors determining transitions attributable to democratic
experience. In this ﬁrst simulation model (Figure 5) the factors mentioned are all constants, having
the same value each year from 1800 to 2000. The total number of states (TotalNoOfStatesSim =
DemocraciesSim + NonDemocraciesSim) must also be simulated in order to include it each year as
a variable in the equation. According to the new model we have two variables available to explain the
pattern of the transitions to democracies due to democratic experience: the CommunicationRate and
the TransitionFraction. The communication rate expresses how often active adopters of democracy
communicate politically with potential adopters. The value of the communication rate for the initial
mode simply means that each year, from 1800 to 2000, actors in every democratic polity
communicated with a number of actors in non-democratic countries in a way that transmitted their
experience of democracy. Such international communications may be facilitated by political
philosophers, diplomats, journalists, or by such mass media as radio, TV, globalized broadcasting,
cell phones, and the Internet. The fraction of communications that actually lead to democratization
rates probably also vary over time. In our case, data from the Banks Time Series will be used to
elaborate the estimate of communication rates.
 The Elaborated Bass Model
Elaboration of the Model
The model in Figure 5 produced a simulation of actual transitions to democracy. This simulation
followed real data raggedness in the curve of transitions to democracy, but failed to boost transition
ﬁgures over the last ﬁfty years. As we noted, actual data suggest a pattern closer to an exponential
function after about 1950. Following World War II, during the Cold War years, and after the fall of the4.2
Berlin Wall, there seem to have been other forces at work altering communication rates between
nation states.
One could assume an increase in communication rates as a logistic function, just as in any diffusion
process (Bass 1969,Rogers 1995). However, the use of actual data to the greatest extent possible is
preferable. Therefore, Banks Times series data on the number of radios and television sets across
the globe have been employed as a proxy or indicator for overall communication about political, as
well as everyday, life in democracies-speciﬁcally, the annual global averages of the national
averages in per capita values in non-democracies, as deﬁned by the Polity IV data set. However,
since newspaper data from the nineteenth century are not very reliable, a base value has been
introduced instead, to which the global national averages of radios and (later) television sets in non-
democracies have been added (see Figures 6 and 7). The communication rate is estimated on the
assumption that new technologies provide possibilities for that rate to increase non-linearly, both
because innovations normally diffuse logistically, and because transitions into democracies affect the
average per capital values of communication in the stock of non-democracies left after such
transitions. As is seen in Figure 7, the resulting curves exhibit a reverse wave in the late 1970s as a
consequence of transitions of countries with high per capita values of communication into
democracies. One also notes that, contrary to what is traditional in democracy diffusion studies,
communication in non-democracies (rather than democracies) is used as a time-series variable to
model transitions to democracy.
Figure 6. The Elaborated Bass Model of Democracy Diffusion 1800-2000 (Source: Polity
IVd and Databanks International. Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive)
Note: Lower model is a copy of upper, except that actual transitions to democracy
(TransToDemRate) are replaced by a simulated ﬂow (TransitionToDemRateSim). This is determined
by factors analogous to Bass with discards model, as further elaborated using data sources below4.3
(see text).
Figure 7. The Global Communication Rates About Democracy in Non-Democracies 1800-2000
Source: Databanks International. Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive. 
Per Capita values of radios and television sets are yearly means of national means in non-democracies as deﬁned by
the Polity IV data set (see deﬁnitions in Figure 1, Table 1, and list of countries in Appendix 1).
CommunicationAboutDemRate equation deﬁned as
0.0380 + (RadiosPerCapitaInNonDem / 2) + TVSetsPerCapitaInNonDem.
Thus, radios are considered as having half the effect of TV sets on communication rates.
The transition fraction is not constant over time, as in the case of the simple Bass models considered
earlier. The transition fraction is deﬁned as the number of times a communication event between an
active and a potential adopter of democracy results in the adoption of democracy, and may change
over time. Thus, transitions to democracy resulting from word-of-mouth, i.e., the soft power of
democracy, not only depend on how many non-democracies and democracies there are, and how
much they communicate, but also on the transition fraction or the fraction of communications that
transforms the attractiveness of democracy into actual steps taken towards it by non-democracies.
This transition fraction has undergone change over time as some regimes are more receptive to the
soft power of democracy than others. Totalitarian regimes can be considered "immune" to it, since
they are closed societies and lack any of the critical democratic institutions listed in Table 1. Figure 8.4.4
Figure 8. Percentage Totalitarian of Non-Democratic Polities 1800-2000 (Source: Polity IV)
Figure 8 shows how the totalitarian share of non-democracies rose from almost nothing in 1880 to
90% a century later. By 2000, however, the international situation returned to where some 50% or
more of all non-democratic polities were totalitarian. Moreover, authoritarian regimes are likely to be
more susceptible to the soft power of democracy than totalitarian states. (Nevertheless, it can be
argued that sudden collapses of totalitarian states are also possible, although as "deaths" of non-
democracies they are not simulated here.) Totalitarian states, on the other hand, are likely to have a
dampening effect on the diffusion of democracy. Consequently, the share of authoritarian and
totalitarian regimes among non-democratic nations is a critical factor for the advancement of
democratization on the global level. Therefore, the transition fraction is deﬁned here as the ratio of
authoritarian states among those that are non-democratic (or 100% minus the percentage of
totalitarian nations among non-democratic polities divided by 100).
TransitionFraction = (100 -
PercentTotalitarianOfNonDemStates) / 100
Deﬁnition: The fraction of communications between non-democracies and democracies
concerning democracy that will actually cause the non-democracies to take steps
toward becoming democracies is deﬁned as a (linear) function of the authoritarian
percentage of non-democratic polities (or 100 minus the totalitarian percentage or
"immune" polities divided by 100).
This deﬁnition completes the extended Bass model of transitions to democracy from 1800 to 2000
(Figure 6). To summarize, the extended version of the Bass model with discards takes into account
the fact that some of the potential adopters of democracy are in reality not bona ﬁde since, being
closed or traditional, they are resistant to democratization. It is also true that technological
innovations over the span of two centuries in the ﬁeld of mass communications (newpapers,
telephones, radio, TV, cell phones, the Internet) have drastically affected communication rates.4.5
Figure 9. Diffusion of Democracy 1800-2000: Actual Total of States, Actual Total of
Democracies, and Simulated Number of Democracies (using model in Fig. 6) (Source:
Polity IVd, Polity IV data, Databanks International. Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data
Archive) Init: DemocraciesSim = InitNoDemCopy, flow: DemocraciesSim = - dt *
ReversalFromDemRateCopy - dt * ExitDemCopy + dt * EntryDemCopy + dt *
TransToDemRateSim.
For complete equation of model, see Appendix 3
As may be seen in Figure 9, the actual diffusion of democracy (heavy line numbered "2" in the
diagram) is much more closely represented by the simulated spread of democracy (thin line
numbered "3") than was the case in the initial model (Figure 5). The lack of exponential democracy
diffusion in the ﬁrst standard Bass model for the post-World War II period is compensated for by the
dynamics of the communication rates and transition fractions in the elaborated model. In the initial
model, only one third of the number of actual democracies in 2000 (28 polities) was reached in the
simulation run. In the elaborated model (Figures 6 to 9), the simulation stops at 82 of the actual 81
democracies (101%), while the simulated form of the diffusion curve remains very close to the real
ﬁgures, as shown in Figure 9. This implies that the elaborated model comes much closer to actual
ﬁgures of transitions to democracy in the last two centuries than the ﬁrst standard model. Still, there
is room for improvement. While space does not permit us to explore this further in the present article,
historical studies of the post-World War II transitions to democracy would make it possible to add
new or improve statistics on the communication patterns in non-democracies, apart from the data
included in the model presented here. Leaving this for future studies, we can instead summarize the
dynamic interactions that will impact on transitions to democracy, according to the projections of the




Figure 10. Actual Transitions to Democracy Rates, Simulated Transitions due to Soft Power
of Democracy, Communication Rates, and Transition Fractions
Source: Polity IVd and Polity IV data, Databanks International. Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive.
Per Capita values of radios and television sets are yearly means of national means in non-democracies as
deﬁned by Polity IV data set. See deﬁnitions in Table 1 and list of countries in Appendix 1. Units as in
equations in Figure 6 and Appendix 3.
In Figure 10 we can see how the transitions to democracy presented earlier (curve 1) are driven
primarily by the soft power of democracy (curve 2). These transitions are further boosted by the
growth in communication rates (curve 3) resulting from the availability of mass communication
technologies in non-democracies, which in turn helps explain transitions to democracy after 1950.
The transition fraction (curve 4) based on the proportion of authoritarian states among non-
democracies serves to improve the wave ﬁt and smooth out the slight raggedness of the simulation
curve. Without the transition fraction variable, the model of democracy diffusion would overshoot real
ﬁgures dramatically for the closing forty years of the twentieth century. The rise of totalitarian vs.
authoritarian states from about 1960 to 1980 (an increase from 40% to 90% in the fraction of
totalitarian regimes among the non-democratic states) accounts for the trough in democracy diffusion
that is seen between 1960 and 1970. Appendix 1 shows the considerable number of non-
democracies that have arisen from previously existing states and newly-created decolonized
nations. They may be the cause of the delay in global diffusion evident in the simulated curve and the
reason employing the transition fraction is crucial for the performance of the model.
The soft power of democracy (curve 2) peaks at the end of the twentieth century, driven by growth in
the communication rate and the transaction fraction. However, in the long run this variable will decline
and resemble the curve that the word-of-mouth effect showed in the lower diagram of the Bass model
(see Figure 2). Since the soft power of democracy requires at least one non-democracy to have a
deﬁned value, it cannot totally vanish unless all states become democratic.
It may easily be seen that the simulated diffusion of democracy does not precisely follow the course
of actual events. For a closer approximation, the model would need to take into account transitions
between totalitarian and authoritarian polities. In fact, steps 0 to 10 on the institutionalized democracy
scale could be incorporated into the model, although doing so would be extremely complicated and
only contribute marginally to understanding the diffusion process. Moreover, it would obscure that
fact that the basic principle of innovation diffusion is very simple: it is an imitation effect, and imitation
requires communication about what is being imitated.
Given the explosion of new communication technologies, the rapid increase in communication rates,
and the rising proportion of authoritarian to totalitarian states, the coming decades should see a great
wave of democracy diffusion. The number of democracies estimated today at approximately 90,
might climb to almost 110 by the year 2050. Such a projected increase would mean an average of
one new democracy every second year for the coming four decades. However, considering that the
current size of the stock of democracies has grown far above the estimated diffusion curve, we may






adaptations of democratic institutions, and further reﬁnements in the institutions of older
democracies, the standard method of national political decision making in the global system of states
will most likely become democracy. The attractiveness of democracy (i.e., its soft power) will then
paradoxically fade in consequence of its success, as citizens in most countries simply take it for
granted. This will necessarily inﬂuence the decreasing number of totalitarian states as well, so it
would appear that eventually most (if not all) nations will appropriate the more desirable regime type
and become democracies.
 Discussion
Some Implications of Results
The analysis of the causes of democracy diffusion will appear provocative to major actors in world
politics-primarily those in international and national aid agencies. It concludes that the global spread
of democracy is best fostered by improved communication about what is going on inside the world's
democracies, rather than by other measures, unless those other measures also contribute to
improved communications.
Most political science research concerning democratization has a statistical and national-
comparative approach that does not and cannot produce long-term results on a global scale: the data
it uses is restricted to the national level, and most often to adopters of democracy rather than
potential ones. However, as mentioned earlier, analysis on the global level does not necessarily
contradict unit (national) level analysis. For certain periods of time between 1800 and 2000, the
correlates of democracy may still be valid for understanding its adoption in a national context, in
which case one should preferably compare "immune", potential, and actual adopters in seeking the
critical reasons for susceptibility. In the present paper we have tried to show that transitions to
democracy primarily result from a systemic interaction among (a) improved communication on the
global system level regarding the ways democracies handle political, economic, social, and cultural
matters, (b) how attractive democratic countries therefore seem to potential adopters of democracy,
but also (c) the ratio of totalitarian polities among non-democracies, which affects how improved
communication impacts transition rates. According to our ﬁndings, the diffusion of democracy is
primarily attributable to soft power and locally-adapted imitations of other well-functioning democratic
institutions.
Conclusion
This article applies a system dynamics simulation tool to the issue of democratization among polities
in the world system between 1800 and 2000. Using Polity IV, Polity IVd, and Banks Times Series
data, we hope to have shown how a Bass diffusion model with discards may help estimate soft
power, thereby bringing together several levels of social analysis: the use of diffusion of innovation
models in political analysis, and the employment of a system dynamics simulation tool in place of
statistical analysis. We believe it represents a new approach to the study of soft power,
attractiveness, or "snowballing" in any social system.
Soft power, as deﬁned by Nye (2003, 2004), is an inherent force driving such aggregate change. As
such it can be modeled in relation to the diffusion of any change. The system dynamic simulation
technique (or stock and ﬂow analysis) is well-suited for modeling such aggregate dynamics.
Conceptually, one needs to consider whether the global diffusion of democracy is actually driven by
factors like democratic ideas-the experience of democracy as it is working elsewhere-and thus the
soft power of democracy. It can be shown that the diffusion of democracy is remarkably analogous to
the diffusion of dynamically driven technological innovations. Accepting this analogy, one can
estimate the effect of soft power (i.e., the attractiveness of institutionalized democracy) and fully
appreciate its historic role in political change.
The major conclusion of our investigation is that the soft power of democracy and the allure of
imitation both act as strong, dynamic forces behind democracy diffusion on a global scale, especially
when communication technologies make it easy to access information about democracy. Most
totalitarian countries showed that they were unable to resist the wave of democracy that swelled at
the end of the twentieth century. The growing proportion of authoritarian regimes among non-
democratic polities has already affected the rate of transitions to democracy. Our results suggest that
that, given improved global and international communication, it has been soft power and reduced
"immunity" to political change among totalitarian and authoritarian states that have been the major
factors behind the historic spread of democratic institutions worldwide. Actual ﬁgures of democracy
diffusion are convincingly explained by the proper systemic mix of these factors.
 Appendix 1: The Polity IVd Data Set: Polities and Institutionalized
DemocracyTable A1: The Polity IVd Data Set: Polities and Institutionalized
Democracy (Source: Polity IV (Polity value 6-10 coded as 1, Polity value
0-5 coded as 0))



































































































































































1915 1 Polity: 1 Polity:
Greece Denmark
1917 2 Polities: 2 Polities:
Estonia Netherlands
Finland Sweden






1920 1 Polity: 1 Polity:Latvia Austria
1921 1 Polity: I Polity:
Yugoslavia Ireland







1926 1 Polity: 1 Polity: 1 Polity:
Saudi Arabia Poland Greece
1928 1 Polity:
Lithuania






















1943 1 Polity: 1 Polity:
Lebanon Argentina












1948 2 Polities: 2 Polities: 3 Polities: 1 Polity:
Korea, North Colombia Israel Italy
Korea, South Czechoslovakia Myanmar
(Burma)






















1957 1 Polity: 1 Polity:
Malaysia Colombia
1958 1 Polity: 2 Polities: 1Polity: 1 Polity:
Guinea Pakistan Laos Venezuela
Sudan
1959 1 Polity: 2 Polities:
Tunisia Jamaica
Singapore
1960 15 Polities: 1 Polity: 3 Polities: 1 Polity:


















1961 2 Polities: 3 Polities: 1 Polity: 1 Polity:
Rwanda Brazil Sierra Leone Turkey
Tanzania Korea, South
Syria






1963 2 Polities: 1 Polity:
Kenya PeruKuwait
1964 2 Polities: 1 Polity:
Malawi Chile
Zambia
























1970 2 Polities: 2 Polities:
Ecuador Fiji
Lesotho Zimbabwe





















1976 1 Polity: 1 Polity: 1 Polity:
Vietnam Argentina Portugal
1977 1 Polity: 1 Polity:
Djibouti Pakistan










1980 2 Polities: 1 Polity:
Burkina Faso Peru
Turkey
1982 1 Polity: 2 Polities:
Ghana Bolivia
Honduras
1983 1 Polity: 2 Polities:
Zimbabwe Argentina
Turkey
1984 1 Polity: 1 Polity:
Nigeria El Salvador





















1991 9 Polities: 1 Polity: 8 Polities: 4 Polities:





















1993 2 Polities: 1 Polity: 2 Polities: 2 Polities:










1995 2 Polities: 1 Polity:
Armenia Georgia
Belarus












1999 1 Polity: 2 Polities:
Pakistan Indonesia
Nepal








2002 1 Polity: 1 Polity: 1 Polity:
Nepal East Timor Kenya
2003 1 Polity: 1 Polity:
Armenia Serbia and
Montenegro
Note: Values for the year 1800 ("Init.") are initial values, not transitions, entries or exits that year.
 Appendix 2: Exits of Non-Democracies and Democracies 1800-2003
Table A2: Exits of Non-Democracies and Democracies 1800-2003
(Source: Polity IVd. For coding, see Appendix 1. Listed by order of age
as polity)
Year  Number and 
list of non-democracy exits
Number and list of democracy exits
1832 1 Polity:
Gran Colombia
































1990 3 Polities: 1 Polity







 Appendix 3: Model code
A *.sim ﬁle created with the Powersim simulation software, downloadable from
http://www.Powersim.com, with the full elaborated Bass model of Figures 6-10, may be downloaded
as a ZIP archive from here. Using the model, test runs as well as further modiﬁcations of the model
can be made, such as including subsequent years or changing model parameters.
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1 Diamond supports this analysis in an insightful study (2003).
2 This appears in Nye's classic work (2003) as follows:
A country may achieve its preferred outcomes in world politics because other countries
want to emulate it or have agreed to a system that produces such effects. In this sense,
it is just as important to set the agenda and structure situations in world politics, as it is
to get others to change in particular situations. This aspect of power-that is, getting
others to want what you want—might be called attractive, or soft power behavior.
One may say that while hard power may lead the horse to water, soft power makes the horse drink.
In Soft Power (2004: 7), Nye argues that this power, or the “ability to shape what others want”, can
rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of
political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express certain preferences because they
seem too unrealistic. Power-hard or soft-is notoriously difﬁcult to measure and analyze in quantitative
terms (Dahl 1957, Bachrach & Baratz 1962, 1963, Lukes 1974, Nye 2003, 2004). In the present
study, however, the problem of power (soft power in particular) is addressed through a system
dynamics model of diffusion of innovation created by Bass (1969). It should be emphasized that
world system approaches to democracy diffusion are not inimical to national level comparative
studies. Just as epidemiology does not contradict immunology, global diffusion studies do not
contradict comparative political studies. The former focuses on why an epidemic is successful, while
the question for the later is what factors make a country particularly susceptible to the epidemic. In
this sense, world systems analyses, including those of Wallerstein (2004) and others such as Chase
Dunn & Hall (1997) and Turchin (2003) detect different phenomena at different levels of analysis, just
as this study is focused on aggregate or world systemic behavior.
3 As mentioned above this line based on the fraction democratic of the world's population has a ﬁt
reaching R2 = .91. Modelski & Perry state that the value of R2 = .952, but this is actually the R value
itself, giving us 'only' R2 = .9077 (i.e., .91). All other factors and equations are correct in their
presentation.
4 For a discussion of democracy theories and measurement, see ￅberg & Sandberg (2003).
5 The present homepage of the Polity Project is: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
6 This is certainly so if collinear variables are involved. Let us say that the number of democracies in
the world were included in a vector autoregression analysis, together with explanatory factors like
the number of non-democracies, the number of newly-emerging democracies and non-democracies,
as well as disappearing democracies and non-democracies, and the total number of states in the
world. In that case the multicolliary would be 1. This would be the same as explaining the individuals
in a community on the basis of numbers of births, deaths, emigrants, and immigrants. Mathematically,
fully-determined stock and ﬂow systems cannot be analysed using statistical techniques because
full determination leaves no room for probabilities. Thus, the present article is a test of the scientiﬁc
validity of constructing such a deterministic model-a simpliﬁed, artiﬁcial system.
7 Vensim and I-think are two other system dynamics simulation tools, the latter designed for Mac.
8 The mathematical deﬁnition of the simulation of number of democracies is therefore (see Appendix
3):
init Democracies = InitNoDem
flow Democracies =  + dt * EntryDem - dt * ExitDem - dt * ReveralslFromDemRate
 + dt * TransToDemRate
The initial value (init) of the simulated number of democracies (DemocraciesSim) equals 1 (namely,
the US), and the number equals the differential of births of democracies, minus the differential of
deaths of democracies, minus the differential of reversals from democracies, plus the differential of
transitions to democracies.
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